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Brendan Lucier∗ Renato Paes Leme†
Abstract
The Generalized Second Price auction is the primary method by which sponsered search advertise-
ments are sold. We study the performance of this auction under various equilibrium concepts. In partic-
ular, we demonstrate that the Bayesian Price of Anarchy is at most 2(1 − 1/e)−1 ≈ 3.16, significantly
improving upon previously known bounds.
Our techniques are intuitively straightforward and extend in a number of ways. For one, our result
extends to a bound on the performance of GSP at coarse correlated equilibria, which captures (for exam-
ple) a repeated-auction setting in which agents apply regret-minimizing bidding strategies. In addition,
our analysis is robust against the presence of byzantine agents who cannot be assumed to participate
rationally.
Additionally, we present tight bounds for the social welfare obtained at pure NE for the special case
of an auction for 3 slots, and discuss potential methods for extending this analysis to an arbitrary number
of slots.
1 Introduction
The sale of advertising space is the primary source of revenue for many providers of online services.
This is due, in part, to the fact that providers can tailor advertisements to the preferences of individual
users. A search engine, for example, can choose to display ads that synergize well with a query being
searched. However, such dynamic provision of content complicates the process of selling ad space to
potential advertisers. The now-standard method has advertisers place bids – representing the amount
they would be willing to pay per click – which are resolved in an automated auction whenever ads are to
be displayed.
By far the most popular bid-resolution method currently in use is the Generalized Second Price
auction (GSP), a generalization of the well-known Vickrey auction. In the GSP, there are multiple ad
“slots” of varying appeal (i.e. slots at the top of the page are more effective). Advertisers are assigned
slots in order of their bids, with the highest bidders receiving the best slots; each advertiser then pays
an amount equal to the bid of the next-highest bidder. While simple to understand and use, the GSP has
some notable drawbacks: unlike the Vickrey auction it is not truthful, and it does not generally guarantee
the most efficient outcome (i.e. the outcome that maximizes social welfare). Nevertheless, the use of
GSP has been extremely successful in practice. This begs the question: are there theoretical properties
of the Generalized Second Price auction that would explain its prevalence?
Here we continue the line of work aimed at answering this question by analyzing the performance of
GSP under various models of rational agent behaviour. First, we consider Bayes-Nash equilibria (BNE)
of GSP. In this model, the auction is viewed as a partial-information game in which each participant’s
value per click is private information drawn independently at random from commonly-known distribu-
tions. Such a model is particularly relevant for online ad auctions, since historical data can readily be
observed to develop accurate market statistics. A BNE is then a profile of bidding strategies whereby
each agent maximizes his expected profit subject to the distribution over the other agents’ values. We
study the expected social welfare that GSP attains at any BNE, as a fraction of the optimal social welfare.
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This metric is commonly known as the Bayesian Price of Anarchy, representing the loss in efficiency due
to having outcomes determined at BNE rather than a benevolent optimizer.
The BNE solution concept captures scenarios in which a large market of advertisers settle into a stable
pattern of bidding strategies. However, empirical studies show that bidding need not stabilize in some
cases. Advertising slot auctions can be repeated millions of times per day, and there are bidding patterns
in which agents modify their strategies over time to respond to each others’ bids. To address such cases,
one must consider GSP in the broader context of a repeated auction. In such settings, we assume that an
agent’s value per click does not change over time, but declared bids can change each round. A solution
concept then describes rational behaviour over many instances of the auction (i.e. a method of responding
to the past play of other agents), and the metric of interest is the average social welfare attained by GSP
over many rounds.
We consider an equilibrium model suited to long-run bidder behaviour in GSP. Namely, we consider
settings in which agents choose their bids so that their regret vanishes over time. Roughly speaking, such
a model assumes that agents observe the bidding patterns of others and modify their own bids in such a
way that their long-term performance approaches that of a single optimal strategy chosen in hindsight. It
is well-known from learning theory that such regret minimization is easy to achieve via simple bidding
techniques. We bound the Price of Total Anarchy, which is the ratio between the social welfare of the
optimal allocation and the average social welfare obtained by GSP when agents minimize regret over a
sufficiently long number of rounds.
Results Our main result is a bound on the social welfare obtained at Bayes-Nash equilbrium for the
GSP auction. Specifically, we show that the Bayesian Price of Anarchy for GSP is at most 2(1−1/e)−1 ≈
3.164. This improves upon the previous best-known bounds of 8 for BNE and 4 for (mixed) NE [9].
Perhaps just as important as the improved bounds, however, is the straightforward and robust nature
of our proof. In particular, our results extend to give the same bound for coarse correlated equilibria,
which implies that the Price of Total Anarchy is at most 2(1 − 1/e)−1. Moreover, these results are
resilient against the presence of Byzantine agents, in the following sense. Suppose that, in addition to
the rational participants in the auction, there is also some set of agents who apply arbitrary strategies.
We can view these as irrational participants who do not understand how to bid strategically. Note that,
in such a setting, it is not possible for an auction to guarantee a fraction of the social welfare obtainable
from the irrational bidders; after all, a bidder with very large value may decide (irrationally) to bid 0
and effectively not participate in the auction. What we can show, however, is that the presence of the
irrational bidders does not interfere with the auction’s ability to approximate the welfare obtainable from
the rational bidders. That is, the ratio of the optimal social welfare of the rational bidders to the total
social welfare obtained at any BNE is at most 2(1− 1/e)−1 ≈ 3.164. This result requires an assumption
on the play of the irrational bidders, which is that no player bids more than his true value. We feel that this
is a reasonable assumption, as overbidding is a dominated strategy that is easily avoided; we therefore
view the irrational bidders as novice or uninformed participants who would avoid dominated strategies,
rather than truly adversarial agents.
Our results hold for a standard model of separable click-through rates, where the probability that a
user clicks on an advertisement j in slot i is of the form αiγj . That is, it is a product of two separable
components: one for the advertiser, and one for the slot. For ease of exposition, we will focus on the
special case that γj = 1 for all j. However, we note that our results extend to the more general case of
separable click-through rates.
Related work In recent years there has been a surge of work on algorithmic mechanism design for
sponsored search, beginning with Mehta et al. [13, 12]. See the survey of Lahaie et al [7] for an overview
of subsequent developments. The GSP model applied in this manuscript is due to Edelman et al [2] and
Varian [15].
The work most closely related to ours is that of Paes Leme and Tardos, who also study equilibria
of GSP [9]. They give upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy in pure, mixed, and Bayesian strategies;
achieving bounds of 1.618, 4, and 8, respectively. Our main result is a simplification and strengthening
of their results for the mixed and Bayesian cases, as well as an extension to different but related solution
concepts.
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Edelman et al [2] and Varian [15] study Envy-free equilibria of GSP (a special case of Nash equi-
librium) in the full information setting. They demonstrate that such equilibria exist, and that all such
equilibria are socially optimal. Gomes and Sweeney [3] study the Generalized Second Price Auction in
the Bayesian context. They show that, unlike the full information case, there may not exist symmetric
or socially optimal equilibria in this model, and obtain sufficient conditions on click-through-rates that
guarantee the existence of a symmetric and efficient equilibrium. Lahaie [8] also considers the problem
of bounding the social welfare obtained at equilibrium, but restricts attention to the special case that
click-through-rate αi decays exponentially along the slots with a factor of 1δ . Lahaie proves a price of
anarchy of min{ 1δ , 1−
1
δ }.
Lucier and Borodin [11] study the Bayesian price of anarchy for greedy combinatorial auctions.
They show via a type of smoothness argument (see [14]) that a greedy c-approximation algorithm can
be turned into a mechanism with Price of Anarchy c+ 1 - for pure and mixed Nash and for Bayes-Nash
equilibria. Lucier [10] considers repeated greedy auctions and studies the design of mechanisms with
bounded price of total anarchy and price of sinking. These results do not imply bounds for GSP, since
it is not a combinatorial auction (and, in particular, GSP does not provide a bidding language expressive
enough to implement their mechanisms). However, the approach taken in our work is similar to the one
that drives their results.
The study of regret-minimization goes back to the work of Hannan on repeated two-player games [4].
Kalai and Vempala [6] extend the work of Hannan to online optimization problems, and Kakade et al [5]
further extend to settings of approximate regret minimization. Blum et al [1] apply regret-minimization
to the study of inefficiency in repeated games, coining the phrase “price of total anarchy” for the worst-
case ratio between the optimal objective value and the average objective value when agents minimize
regret.
2 Preliminaries
We consider an auction with n advertisers and n slots1. An outcome is an assignment of advertisers to
slots. An outcome can be viewed as a permutation pi with pi(k) being the player assigned to slot k. Being
assigned to the k-th slot results in αk clicks, where α1 ≥ α2 ≥ . . . ≥ αn. Each advertiser i has a private
type vi, representing his or her value per click received. The sequence v = (v1, . . . , vn) is referred to as
the type profile. We will write v−i for v excluding the ith entry, so that v = (vi,v−i).
A mechanism for this auction elicits a bid bi ∈ [0,∞) from each agent i, which is interpreted as a
type declaration, and returns an assignment as well as a price pi per click for each agent. If advertiser
i is assigned to slot j, his utility is αj(vi − pi), which is the number of clicks received times profit per
click. The social welfare of outcome pi is SW (pi,v) = ∑j αjvpi(j), the total value of the solution for
the participants. The optimal social welfare is OPT (v) = maxpi SW (pi,v).
We focus on a particular mechanism, the Generalized Second Price auction, which works as follows.
Given bid profile b, the auction sets pi(k) to be the advertiser with the kth highest bid (breaking ties ar-
bitrarily). That is, GSP assigns slots with higher click-through-rate to agents with higher bids. Payments
are then set according to pi = bpi(pi−1(i)+1). That is, the payment of the kth highest bidder is precisely
the bid of the next-highest bidder (where we take bn+1 = 0). We will write ui(b) for the utility derived
by agent i from the GSP when agents bid according to b.
For the remainder of the paper, we will write pi(b, j) to be the player assigned to slot j by GSP when
the agents bid according to b. We will also write σ(b, i) for the slot assigned to bidder i by GSP, again
when agents bid according to b. We write pii(b−i, j) to be the player that would be assigned to slot j by
GSP if agent i did not participate in the auction. We will write ν(v) for the optimal assignment of slots
to bidders for value profile v, so that ν(v, i) is the slot that would be allocated to agent i in the optimal
assignment2.
1we handle unequal numbers of slots and advertisers by adding virtual slots with click-through-rate zero or virtual advertisers
with zero value per click.
2We note that, since GSP makes the optimal assignment for a given bid declaration, we actually have that ν(v, i) and σ(v, i) are
identically equal. We define ν mainly for use when emphasizing the distinction between an optimal assignment for a value profile
and the assignment that results from a given bid profile.
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2.1 Pure and Mixed Nash Equilibrium
A (pure) strategy for agent i is a function bi : R≥0 → R≥0 that maps each private value to a declared
bid. A mixed strategy maps a private value to a distribution over bids, corresponding to a randomized
declaration.
We will make the standard assumption that agents apply strategies that never overbid. Thatis, we
restrict our attention to strategies in which bi(vi) assigns probability 0 to all bids larger than vi, for all
i and vi. This assumption is motivated by the fact that overbidding is a dominated strategy: an agent’s
expected utility can only increase by replacing a bid larger than vi with a bid of vi.
Given a value profile v, we say that strategy profile b is a mixed Nash equilibrium if, for all i and all
alternative strategies b′i(·),
Eui(bi(vi), b−i(v−i)) ≥ Eui(b
′
i(vi), b−i(v−i)).
That is, each agent i maximizes his utility by bidding according to strategy b′i(·). We say this is a pure
Nash equilibrium if, in addition, all strategies are pure. We define the (mixed) Price of Anarchy to be the
worst-case ratio between social welfare in the optimum and expected social welfare in GSP across all
valuation profiles and all mixed Nash equilibria:
sup
v,b(·)NE
OPT (v)
Eb[SW (pi(b(v)),v)]
.
2.2 Bayesian setting
In a Bayesian setting, we suppose that each agent’s type is drawn from a publicly known distribution.
That is, v ∼ F where F = F1 × F2 × . . . × Fn. We then say that strategy profile b is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium for distributions F if, for all i, all vi, and all alternative strategies b′i,
Ev−i∼F−i [ui(bi(vi),b−i(v−i))] ≥ Ev−i∼F−i [ui(b
′
i(vi),b−i(v−i))]
That is, each agent maximizes his expected utility by bidding in accordance with strategy bi(·), where
expectation is taken over the distribution of the other agents’ types and any randomness in their strategies.
We define the Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy to be the worst-case ratio between social welfare in the
optimum and social welfare in GSP across all distributions and all Nash equilibria:
max
F,b(·)BNE
Ev∼F[OPT (v)]
Ev∼F,b(v)[SW (pi(b(v)),v]
.
2.3 Repeated Auctions
We now turn to repeated versions of GSP. In this setting, the GSP auction is run T ≥ 1 times with the
same slots and agents. The private value profile v of the agents does not change between rounds, but
the agents are free to change their bids. We write bti for the bid of agent i on round t. We refer to D =
(b1, . . . , bT ) as a declaration sequence. We will write pi(D) for the sequence of permutations generated
by GSP on input sequence D. The average social welfare generated by GSP is then SW (pi(D),v) =
1
T
∑
t SW (pi(b
t),v).
Declaration sequence D = (b1, . . . , bT ) minimizes external regret for agent i if, for any fixed dec-
laration bi,
∑
t ui(b
t
i, b
t
−i) ≥
∑
t ui(bi, b
t
−i) + o(T ). That is, as T grows large, the utility of agent i
approaches the utility of the optimal fixed strategy in hindsight. The Price of Total Anarchy is the worst-
case ratio between social welfare in the optimum and the average social welfare obtained by GSP across
all declaration sequences that minimize external regret for all agents. That is, the price of total anarchy is
lim
T→∞
max
v,D
OPT (v)
SW (pi(D),v)
where the maximum is taken over declaration sequences that minimize external regret for all agents.
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3 Bayesian Price of Anarchy
In this section we prove the following upper bound on the Bayesian Price of Anarchy for GSP.
Theorem 1 The Bayesian Price of Anarchy of GSP is at most 2(1− 1/e)−1 ≈ 3.164.
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds in two steps. We first show that a structural property of bidding
profiles implies a bound on the social welfare obtained by GSP (Lemma 2). We then show that this
structural property holds at all BNE of the GSP (Lemma 3).
Lemma 2 Suppose that v ∼ F and agents apply strategy profile b(·). Suppose further that the following
is true:
Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)vi + αkbpii(b−i(v−i),k)] ≥ γαkvi for all slots k, players i, and values vi. (1)
Then Ev∼F[SW (pi(b(v)),v)] ≥ 12γEv∼F[OPT (v)].
Lemma 3 At any BNE of GSP, (1) holds with γ = 1− 1e .
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 immediately imply Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 2 : Fix some value profile v. For notational convenience, let Γ be the induced
distribution on bid profiles b = b(v) when v ∼ F. Then for any player i, value vi, and slot k, if we
write bi = bi(vi), then we can express (1) as:
Eb−i∼Γ−i [ασ(b,i)vi] + Eb−i∼Γ−i [αkbpii(b−i,k)] ≥ γαkvi.
Note that v−i does not appear in this expression; bids b−i are taken to be drawn from induced distribution
Γ−i. Now, recalling that ν(v, i) is the slot assigned to player i in the optimal assignment for values v,
we can take k = ν(v, i) in the above inequality. We then have
Eb−i∼Γ−i [ασ(b,i)vi] + Eb−i∼Γ−i [αν(v,i)bpii(b−i,ν(v,i))] ≥ γαν(v,i)vi
for all v and all i. Notice that the strategy bi(·) does not appear in the second term, so we can rewrite as
Eb−i∼Γ−i [ασ(b,i)vi] + Eb∼Γ[αν(v,i)bpii(b−i,ν(v,i))] ≥ γαν(v,i)vi.
Summing over all i and taking expectation over v:
Ev∼F
[∑
i
Eb−i∼Γ−i [ασ(b,i)vi]
]
+ Ev∼F
[∑
i
Eb∼Γ[αν(v,i)bpii(b,ν(v,i))]
]
≥ γEv∼F
[∑
i
αν(v,i)vi
]
Consider each of the three expectations in the above expression. For the third term, we note
Ev∼F
[∑
i
αν(v,i)vi
]
= Ev∼F[OPT (v)].
For the first term, linearity of expectation implies
Ev∼F
[∑
i
Eb−i∼Γ−i [ασ(b,i)vi]
]
= Ev∼F
[∑
i
ασ(b(v),i)vi
]
= Ev∼F[SW (pi(b(v)),v)].
For the second expectation, notice that:
Ev∼F,b∼Γ
[∑
i
αν(v,i)bpii(b−i,ν(v,i))
]
≤ Ev∼FEb∼Γ
[∑
i
αν(v,i)bpi(b,ν(v,i))
]
= Eb∼Γ
[∑
k
αkbpi(b,k)
]
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which is Ev∼F[SW (pi(v),v)].
We therefore conclude 2Ev∼F[SW (pi(v),v)] ≥ γEv∼F[OPT (v)], completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3 : We wish to show that Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)vi + αkbpii(b−i(v−i),k)] ≥ γαkvi, for all
slots k, players i, and values vi. First, note that if αk < Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)] then the result is trivial. So,
let’s consider αk ≥ Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)]. We’ll prove that
Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)vi + αkbpii(b−i(v−i),k)] ≥ αkvi − Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)vi] · log
αkvi
Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)vi]
and then dividing everything by αkvi and using that log(x)x ≤
1
e we get the desired result.
Consider any bid b′i for agent i such that bi < b′i < vi. Then for each slot k, since bid bi is utility-
maximizing for agent i, the utility of bidding b′i satisfies
Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)vi] ≥ Ev−i [ui(b
′
i,b−i)].
Also, if agent i bids b′i and moreover it is true that bpii(b−i,k) < b′i, then agent i will win a slot with at
least αk clicks. Thus,
Ev−i [ui(b
′
i,b−i)] ≥ (vi − b
′
i)αkPv−i [bpii(b−i(v−i),k) < b
′
i].
Combining these two inequalities and substituting z = vi − b′i, we get
Pv−i[vi − bpii(b−i(v−i),k) > z] ≤
1
z · αk
Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)vi].
We are now able to estimate the expected value of vi − bpii(b−i,k) using the fact that
Ev−i [vi − bpii(b−i(v−i),k)] ≥
∫ ∞
0
Pv−i[vi − bpii(b−i(v−i),k) > z]dz.
Since vi − bpii(b−i(v−i),k) ≤ vi with probability 1, we have
E[vi − bpii(b−i,k)] =
∫ vi
0
Pv−i[vi − bpii(b−i(v−i),k) > z]dz
≤
∫
Ev
−i
[ασ(b(v),i)vi]/αk
0
1dz +
∫ vi
Ev
−i
[ασ(b(v),i)vi]/αk
Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)vi]
αkz
dz
≤
Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)vi]
αk
+
Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)vi]
αk
(
log vi − log
Ev−i [ασ(b(v),i)vi]
αk
)
.
Multiplying both sides by αk and rearranging gives the required inequality.
3.1 Correlated bids and Price of Total Anarchy
Notice that the proof of the previous section applies even in cases where agent bids are coarsely corre-
lated. In such a case, we can consider a common source of randomnessR and each bidding function to be
a function bi(vi, r), where r ∼ R. We call a profile of bidding functions a coarse correlated equilibrium
if:
Ev−i∼F−i [ui(bi(vi, r),b−i(v−i, r))] ≥ Ev−i∼F−i [ui(b
′
i(vi, r),b−i(v−i, r))], ∀i, vi, r
We still suppose vi ∼ Fi where Fi are independent distributions. In this case, F and R induce a
distribution Γ on the bids.
Adapting Lemma 3 to this context is straightforward. Now, to adapt Lemma 2, observe that the only
additional requirement is that we must argue that
Eb−i∼Γ−i [ασ(v,i)bpii(b−i,σ(v,i))] = Eb∼Γ[ασ(v,i)bpii(b−i,σ(v,i))].
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However, this follows because the marginal of b ∼ Γ restricted to −i is exactly b−i ∼ Γ−i.
We now note that the result from the previous section implies a bound on the price of total anarchy
for GSP. This follows because, whenever bidding sequence D = (b1, . . . ,bT ) minimizes regret for all
agents, the bidding strategy with shared randomness bi(vi, t) = bit(vi) for t ∈ [T ] is a coarse correlated
equilibrium. Lemmas 2 and 3 therefore imply that, for all v,
Et∈[T ][SW (pi(b
t(v)),v)] ≥
1
2
(1− 1/e)OPT (v)
which implies that the price of total anarchy is bounded by 2(1− 1/e)−1.
3.2 Byzantine Agents
We now consider a setting in which, in addition to the n advertisers who bid rationally, there are m
“byzantine” advertisers who may bid irrationally. Write N for the set of rational advertisers, and M for
the set of irrational advertisers. Note that we still think of the irrational advertisers as being true players,
who stil receive value per click. The irrational bidders simply cannot be assumed to play at equilibrium;
for example, they may not have experience with the GSP auction, or not know about historical bidding
patterns.
Given an outcome pi (which is an assignment of these n +m bidders to n +m slots), the definition
of social welfare is unchanged: it is SW (pi,v) =
∑
i∈N∪M viαpi(i). We define the social welfare of
bidders in N to be precisely that: SWN (pi,v) =
∑
i∈N viαpi(i). The optimal social welfare for bidders
in N is OPTN (v) = maxpi SWN (pi,v).
We wish to show that the total social welfare obtained by GSP is a good approximation to OPTN (v)
when the players in N play at equilibrium and the players in M play arbitrarily. That is, the addition
of irrational players does not degrade the social welfare guarantees of GSP had they not participated. In
order to make this claim, we must impose a restriction on the behaviour of the irrational players: that
they do not overbid. In other words, we require that bi(vi) ≤ vi for all i ∈ M and all vi. We feel this
is a natural restriction: overbidding is easily seen to be a dominated strategy (i.e. any strategy that bids
higher than vi is dominated by a strategy that lowers such bids to be at most vi). Moreover, it is arguable
that inexperienced bidders would bid conservatively, and not risk a large payment with no gain.
Given that byzantine agents do not overbid, we note that our BPoA bounds go through in this setting
almost without change. In particular, our structural property (1) continues to hold for all agents in N .
Lemma 4 Equation (1) holds with γ = 1− 1e for all for all i ∈ N .
Proof. This proof follows the proof of Lemma 3 without change. Note that in that proof we used only
the fact that the bidding strategy of agent i is a best response, so the fact that other agents may not bid at
equilibrium does not affect the argument.
The corresponding version of Lemma 2 then follows from (1) just as in the setting without byzantine
agents.
Lemma 5 If (1) holds for all i ∈ N , then Ev∼F[SW (pi(b(v)),v)] ≥ 12γEv∼F[OPTN (v)].
Proof. Precisely as in the proof of Lemma 2, we obtain
Ev∼F
[∑
i∈N
Eb−i∼Γ−i [ασ(b,i)vi]
]
+ Ev∼F
[∑
i∈N
Eb∼Γ[αν(v,i)bpii(b,ν(v,i))]
]
≥ γEv∼F
[∑
i∈N
αν(v,i)vi
]
where we note that the summations are over agents in N . Then, as in Lemma 2,
Ev∼F
[∑
i∈N
αν(v,i)vi
]
= Ev∼F[OPT (v)].
and
Ev∼F
[∑
i∈N
Eb−i∼Γ−i [ασ(b,i)vi]
]
= Ev∼F[SWN (pi(b(v)),v)] ≤ Ev∼F[SW (pi(b(v)),v)].
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For the second expectation, notice that:
Ev∼F,b∼Γ
[∑
i∈N
αν(v,i)bpii(b−i,ν(v,i))
]
≤ Ev∼FEb∼Γ
[∑
i∈N
αν(v,i)bpi(b,ν(v,i))
]
= Eb∼Γ

 ∑
k:∃i∈N,ν(v,i)=k
αkbpi(b,k)

 ≤ Eb∼Γ
[∑
k
αkvpi(b,k)
]
= Ev∼F[SW (pi(v),v)].
We therefore conclude 2Ev∼F[SW (pi(v),v)] ≥ γEv∼F[OPTN (v)], completing the proof.
Together, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 imply that the Bayesian Price of Anarchy of GSP is at most
2(1 − 1/e)−1 even in the presence of irrational bidders. Following the comments in Section 3.1, we
can apply the same argument to obtain a matching bound on the Price of Total Anarchy with irrational
bidders.
4 Towards a Tight Pure PoA
In [9], Paes Leme and Tardos give a bound of 1.618 for the Pure Price of Anachy of GSP. They also
prove that for n = 2 slots, the correct bound is 1.25. Here we show that for n = 3, the correct bound is
1.25913. We conjecture that this is the correct Price of Anarchy for GSP (for any number of slots) and
we suggest an approach to prove this result.
Lemma 6 For n = 3 slots, the pure Price of Anarchy of GSP is exactly 1.25913.
Proof. Fix one permutation pi. If there is an i s.t. pi(i) = i then it is easy to show the Price of Anarchy
is bounded by 1.25. This excludes all but two allocations which we analyze below. They are: (i) pi =
[2, 3, 1] and (ii) pi = [3, 1, 2].
Case (i): pi = [2, 3, 1]. We can write the price of anarchy as:
PoA =
α1v1 + α2v2 + α3v3
α3v1 + α1v2 + α2v3
Now, notice that the coefficient of v2 is smaller in the numerator than in the denominator. The same
is true for v3. Now, we use the following simple observation about ratios: if a ≤ b and v ≥ v′ then:
x+av
y+bv ≤
x+av′
y+bv′ , which is natural, because decreasing v we decrease the denominator more than the
numerator. Now, we use that technique to bound v2 and v3 in terms of v1:
• v2 ≥
α1−α3
α1
v1
• v3 ≥
α2−α3
α2
v1
The first inequality comes from the Nash inequalities α3(v1 − 0) ≥ α1(v1 − b2) ≥ α1(v1 − v2) and the
second comes from the fact that α3(v1 − 0) ≥ α2(v1 − b3) ≥ α2(v1 − v3). Now, we get:
PoA ≤
α1v1 + α2
[
α1−α3
α1
v1
]
+ α3
[
α2−α3
α2
v1
]
α3v1 + α1
[
α1−α3
α1
v1
]
+ α2
[
α2−α3
α2
v1
] (2)
Which allows us to eliminate v1 and optimize for α. By standard techniques one can prove that the
optimum is 1.25913 which is the root of a fourth degree equation. The values for which it is maximized
are α1 = 1, α2 = 0.55079, α3 = 0.4704.
Case (ii): pi = [3, 1, 2]. We can write the price of anarchy as:
PoA =
α1v1 + α2v2 + α3v3
α2v1 + α3v2 + α1v3
and again we use the same trick of realizing that v1 ≤ α1α1−α2 v3 by the fact that player 1 doesn’t want to
get the first slot, and v2 ≤ α1α1−α3 v3 by the fact that player 2 doesn’t want to take the first slot. That gives
us:
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PoA ≤
α1
[
α1
α1−α2
v3
]
+ α2
[
α1
α1−α3
v3
]
+ α3v3
α2
[
α1
α1−α2
v3
]
+ α3
[
α1
α1−α3
v3
]
+ α1v3
which has the same solution 1.25913 when maximized. Now, it is maximized for α1 = 1, α2 =
0.5295, α3 = 0.1458. In fact, it is not hard to see that those two PoA expressions have the same maxi-
mum: given a point (1, α2, α3) (wlog we can consider α1 = 1 because the expression is homogeneous),
the second expressions evaluates to the same value in the point (1, 1− α3, α2−α3α2 ).
We proved that 1.25913 is the tight Price of Anarchy for 3 slots (we can use the optimization results
in Case(i) to generate a tight example). We also conjecture that this is the correct Price of Anarchy for
any n ≥ 3. Moreover, we conjecture that the allocation maximizing the Price of Anarchy for n slots is
pi = [2, 3, 4, . . . , n, 1], i.e., the player with higher value takes the bottom slot and all players i > 1 take
slot i− 1. Then, if this is the case, we can prove our desired theorem by showing the following result:
Lemma 7 If an equilibrium with n players and n slots is such that σ(1) = n and σ(i) = i − 1 for the
other players, then the Price of Anarchy is 1.25913.
Proof. Following a proof scheme similar to used in Lemma 6 we can write:
PoA =
α1v1 +
∑
i>1 αivi
αnv1 +
∑
i>1 αi−1vi
≤
α1v1 +
∑
i>1 αi
[
αi−1−αn
αi−1
v1
]
αnv1 +
∑
i>1 αi−1
[
αi−1−αn
αi−1
v1
]
This boils down to optimizing a function on multiple variables. It can be shown using standard techniques
from optimization that the optimum is the same of equation 2. In fact, if (α1, α2, 1) is a solution to 3
slots, then (α1, α2, 1, . . . , 1) is a solution for n slots.
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